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Korea's economy has enjoyed many years 
of gains. High, often double-digit growth 
rates transformed this once very poor 
country into the world's 13th largest econ-
omy and secured it as number 7 in the 
global export ranking list. Yet times have 
changed. Korea's development has faltered 
quite markedly over the last few years. 
More and more problems associated with 
the existing structures are coming to light 
and making reforms an increasingly press-
ing task. All of this is made more acute by 
the cooling off of the economy in China and 
the realignment of the country's previous 
growth model to a more domestically-
oriented strategy, as China is by far the 
country's largest trade partner. Realign-
ment is therefore also imperative in Korea. 
 
Economy in trouble 
 
In its assessment of developments in 2014, 
the Ministry of Finance in Seoul had clear 
words: "Chronic structural problems have 
beset the Korean economy: Low growth 
persists, new growth engines have been 
declining (Ministry of Strategy and Finance, 
2015 Economic Policy Directions: Evaluat-
ing 2014's Economic Policies). If this trend 
continues, low growth will become the new 
norm. 
 
One year on, it looks as though Korea must 
in fact prepare itself for tougher times. In 
the first half of 2015, the outbreak of the 
respiratory disease MERS counteracted the 
measures initiated from 2014 to stimulate 
the economy. Private consumption, in par-
ticular, temporarily displayed a drastic de-
cline. Greater investment in equipment and 
construction was only able to partially com-
pensate for this. In terms of foreign trade, 
the economic slowdown in China and other 
emerging economies, yet also the revalua-
tion of the won had a negative impact on 
goods exports. According to information 
provided by the Korea International Trade 
Association, exports declined by 6.6% in 
the first nine months of 2015 over the 
same time period in the previous year. The 
prospects of a reversal of trends do not 
look good. However, this has failed to set 
alarm bells ringing in Seoul, as economic 
policy in Korea remains largely dominated 
by the traditional model of export-based 
growth. 
 
Even though increased domestic demand 
allowed economic output to increase by 1.2% 
in real terms over the previous quarter be-
tween July and September 2015, and 
thereby register the strongest quarterly 
growth since 2010, the uncertain situation 
of the global economy leaves no room for 
excessive optimism. Even central bank 
governor Lee Ju-yeol accepts this: "Be-
cause exports take up a large portion of the 
economy, it is true that they limit the re-
covery of the domestic market." ("Central 
Bank is Firm on Rates Prior to Fed's Move" 
(Korea JoongAng Daily, 13th November 
2015)). For its part, the Bank of Korea 
(BoK) chose not to revise its growth fore-
cast, which had already been downwards 
corrected. For 2015 as a whole, the BoK is 
only anticipating an increase of 2.7% (Bank 
of Korea, Economic Outlook for 2015 and 
2016, press release, 15th October 2015); 
in 2014, the gain was 3.3%. Private insti-
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tutes are even more sceptical: The Hyundai 
Economic Research Institute, for example, 
is only forecasting +2.5% (Weekly Econom-
ic Review, 8 October 2015 (kor.)). 
 
The outlook for 2016, however, is slightly 
more optimistic. The BoK is forecasting a 
real increase in GDP of 3.2%, although the 
Hyundai Institute is still somewhat more 
reserved with its figure of +2.8%. The bank 
primarily expects growth impulses to come 
from domestic demand. Exports are also 
expected to recover slightly compared with 
2015. 
 
However, the assumptions of the top mone-
tary watchdogs are seen by many observ-
ers as too optimistic ("BOK is sanguine on 
growth for 2015 and 2016", Korea 
JoongAng Daily, 17th October 2015). Alt-
hough private consumption did benefit from 
state support measures in 2015, stagnating 
real incomes leave doubts as to whether 
this trend will continue in 2016, according 
to Lee Keun-tae, economist at the LG Eco-
nomic Research Institute. With regard to 
the upturn in exports, even Yoon Sang-jick, 
Minister for Trade, Industry and Energy, 
has remained reserved. The Korea 
JoongAng Daily quotes him as follows: 
"[…]we forecast that exports are unlikely to 
get better next year due to the continuation 
of low oil prices and slow recovery of the 
global economy" ("Gov't Unveils Plans to 
Vitalize Nation's Sluggish Exports", Korea 
JoongAng Daily, 12th November 2015). 
 
Structures need reform 
 
Yet even if the economy does improve 
slightly in 2016, this will not resolve Ko-
rea's problems. This is because the econo-
my is being squeezed from all sides (OECD, 
Korea: Policy Priorities for a Dynamic, In-
clusive and Creative Economy, October 
2015, page 1): For example, China is com-
peting very successfully with Korea in a 
whole range of sectors, including shipbuild-
ing. The dominant corporate culture at the 
major conglomerates (chaebols) urgently 
requires supplementation by small, innova-
tive operations. The rapid ageing of society 
is not only leading to a situation in which 
labour is in short supply, but is also putting 
pressure on public finances. At the same 
time, young people have highly uncertain 
future prospects. This situation is com-
pounded further by an extremely high level 
of private household debt and low produc-
tivity in the services sector. The solution to 
this and other problems requires far-
reaching structural reforms, as these are 
the only way to establish the conditions for 
sustainable, stable growth, writes the OECD, 
thereby supporting the assessment of the 
Korean Ministry of Finance. However, re-
forms of this kind take time, especially 
since a great deal of resistance must also 
be overcome. 
 
Korea's government under President Park 
Geun-hye launched several initiatives in 
2013/2014 to make the economy more 
innovative, while at the same time creating 
new jobs. "Creative economy" is the magic 
word. The goal is to connect science, tech-
nology, industry and culture in such a way 
that independent Korean innovations can 
be developed and commercialised. Infor-
mation and communication technology will 
play a key part in this regard (S. Connell, 
Korea's Creative Approach to Economic 
Competitiveness, Blog, Council on Foreign 
Relations: Asia Unbound, 24th February 
2014). The main focus here is on tapping 
the creative potential of small and medium-
sized enterprises, thereby creating a coun-
terweight to the chaebols. The government, 
and here in particular a newly established 
"Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Plan-
ning", is to create the corresponding envi-
ronment for this, for example by removing 
regulatory barriers or securing greater mo-
bility for qualified workers (ebenda). 
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To date, 17 Creative Economy Innovation 
Centres (CEIC) have been created through-
out the country as part of the initiatives. 
Their distribution is based on the respective 
regional characteristics. The Centres are 
run by chaebols. For example, Samsung 
Electronics operates two Centres in Daegu 
and Gumi (Gyeongbuk province) for new 
"Smart Factory" technologies, as well as 
machine and automotive components, while 
Hyundai Heavy operates a Centre in Ulsan 
for shipbuilding, Hyundai Motor operates a 
Centre in Gwangju for vehicle engineering 
and SK operates a Centre for IuK applica-
tions in the field of agriculture in the ad-
ministrative city of Sejong to the south of 
Seoul. The conglomerates are to help 
promising start-ups, venture companies, 
research institutes and universities in de-
veloping and marketing their technologies 
and products, yet also offer them financial 
and legal support (list of the centres and 
further information: Creative economy & 
innovation centre, http://koreanlii.kr). 
 
However, the creation of the Innovation 
Centres has not been warmly received by 
everyone. The prominent incorporation of 
the chaebols is one point of particular criti-
cism, as many believe their size and corpo-
rate culture make them less than ideal 
partners for turning creative start-ups into 
genuine competitors in the global market. 
According to Chung Yeon-woo, Professor at 
the Ulsan National Institute of Science and 
Technology, it is more likely that the con-
glomerates will simply assimilate the most 
attractive small companies and thereby 
reinforce their dominance even further, 
which is obviously the opposite of what is 
actually planned ("South Korea aims for 
creative economy to end reliance on 
chaebol", Financial Times, 24th June 2015). 
 
However, the government does not gener-
ally consider acquisitions of this kind a 
problem. Indeed, Lee Je-joon, who is re-
sponsible for the zones in the Ministry of 
Science, ICT and Future Planning is quoted 
as saying "such acquisitions would 'not 
necessarily be a bad thing'" (Financial 
Times, ebenda). One general aim of the 
initiatives is to arouse the interest of inves-
tors in small technology companies. The 
state is also making financial resources 
available for this, clearly with success: In 
Seoul's Gangnam district, a range of incu-
bators and accelerators for start-ups have 
been created, which in several cases com-
pete with the Innovation Centres operated 
by the chaebols (ebenda). 
 
In establishing a "creative" economy, Inno-
vation Centres and other organisational 
approaches only represent one step. They 
require supplementary measures, for ex-
ample enabling young people to use their 
creative and entrepreneurial skills. The 
same applies to the question of why young 
people have difficulty finding a job, despite 
having good training. Although it has many 
strengths, the Korean education system 
also has significant deficits (OECD Skills 
Strategy Diagnostic Report - Korea, 5th 
November 2015). Employing more women 
than in the past, as well as improving work-
ing conditions for older employees, is also 
of major significance for long-term econom-
ic development, particularly since the num-
ber of available employees is likely to de-
crease from 2017 onwards as a result of 
the ageing population (ibid.). 
 
Regulatory reforms also need to be contin-
ued if establishment of the "creative" econ-
omy is to succeed. Administrative hurdles 
and complicated regulations impair the de-
velopment of competition and productivity. 
According to the OECD (Korea: Policy Pri-
orities, a.a.O., page 13), reforms would 
have a very positive effect, particularly in 
Korea's tertiary sector, which is lagging well 
behind the manufacturing industry, yet also 
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benefit the entire economy. This applies in 
particular to sectors such as transport or 
legal services, which play an important part 
in the global added value chain. 
 
Whether the parliamentarians responsible 
agree on the urgency of the reforms ap-
pears doubtful, at least from the perspec-
tive of President Park Geun-hye. In No-
vember 2015, she publicly complained that 
important economic and labour market-
related draft laws would not be passed in 
time for the parliamentary elections sched-
uled for mid-April 2016. She stated that the 
drafts would be automatically annulled with 
the lapsing of the legislative period and 
added: "I beg for the passage of the bills at 
every Cabinet meeting, but I feel lament 
because I'm just making an empty echo" 
("Park Increases her Focus on the April 
Elections", Korea JoongAng Daily, 11th No-
vember 2015). 
 
Major dependence on China: A blessing 
or a curse? 
 
In 1992, Korea established diplomatic rela-
tions with China. This primarily effected the 
bilateral exchange of goods. In 2003, its 
western neighbour took over from the US 
as the largest purchaser of Korean goods 
(Korea International Trade Association, Ex-
port & Import Statistics), leaving other 
countries behind. In 2014, Korea supplied 
China with goods worth US$ 145.3 billion, 
representing slightly more than one quarter 
of all exports. The US followed in second 
place at slightly over US$ 70 billion. At the 
same time, imports from China came to 
approximately US$ 90 billion or around 17% 
of the nation's total. China therefore made 
up 21.4% of all Korean foreign trade. By 
way of comparison, China was responsible 
for 20.5% of all goods exchanges in Japan 
and just 13% in Germany. 
 
However, this major dependence is now 
becoming a burden. China has distanced 
itself from the high growth rates of the past 
and is heading towards a "new normality". 
This means lower gains and aligning eco-
nomic development with private consump-
tion, services and innovation. This is having 
an effect on Korea, whose exports to China 
are currently almost all moving in one di-
rection – downwards. The figure for Janu-
ary to September 2015 was -3.8% relative 
to the same period in the previous year. 
 
Korea will also have to get used to the idea 
of low growth or even a decline in exports 
in the future. Most shipments are interme-
diate goods, such as electrical and electron-
ic components, plastics and chemicals, the 
demand for which is declining due to the 
weak economy, but which can also increas-
ingly be substituted by "Made in China" 
products. Indeed, China's efforts to produce 
more technologically sophisticated products 
are playing an important part in this regard. 
This hits Korea where it hurts, as China is 
set to compete even more keenly with this 
country in the future and its market is 
deemed comparably "safe". Korean produc-
ers such as Samsung and LG have previ-
ously dominated the global business with 
LCD panels. According to press reports 
from Seoul, however, China is set to start 
up new production lines from the end of 
2017 to manufacture large-format screens 
that will also allow cost benefits to be 
achieved ("Korea's LCD Industry Stalled at 
8G While China Eyes 11G", Korea Economic 
Daily, 12th November 2015). The situation 
is also compounded by the fact that the 
RMB yuan has become significantly cheaper 
relative to the US dollar since its devalua-
tion in summer 2015. At the same time, 
the won has become more expensive, 
which is putting Korean exporters under 
even more pressure. 
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Calculations made by the Korea Develop-
ment Institute serve to underline the im-
portance that China now holds for Korea's 
economy. Based on these figures, a decline 
in Chinese growth by one percentage point 
would reduce Korea's economic output di-
rectly by 0.2%. However, the figure in-
creases to more than 0.6% when including 
indirect effects on the global market. Sec-
tors that enjoy close export and investment 
relations with China in particular, such as 
the aerospace industry, the electrical and 
electronic sectors, the chemicals industry, 
as well as the engineering sector would also 
be negatively impacted ("Every 1% Fall in 
Chinese Economic Growth to Drag down 
Korean Economy by 0,62%p'…KDI", Korea 
Economic Daily, 10th November 2015) 
 
It remains to be seen exactly what Seoul 
will do about this. A bilateral free trade 
agreement, which Korea and China have 
signed in June 2015, could certainly provide 
new stimulus for goods exchange. The 
same applies to Korea's collaboration with 
the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB). However, changing the structures of 
trade will be more difficult. A recommenda-
tion by the Korea Institute for Industrial 
Economics and Trade (KIET) is to focus 
more on exports of cultural or medical ser-
vices in the future, as well as on consumer 
products such as cosmetics ("What Should 
Korean Firms Do to Capitalize on China's 
Shift toward Consumer Society?", Korea 
Economic Daily, 9th October 2015). 
 
Korean cosmetics in particular are proving 
popular in China, as underlined by the dou-
ble to triple-digit export growth rates of the 
past few years. The US$ 1 billion threshold 
is likely to be exceeded for the first time 
ever in 2015. The reason for this develop-
ment is that Korean TV dramas are ex-
tremely popular in China and are seen as a 
model of Korean consumer trends by view-
ers (P. Kim, "S. Korea Inc. 2.0 Comes Out 
of the Shadows", Nikkei Asian Review, 11th 
November 2015). In this context, many are 
therefore now calling for more tourism ser-
vices that target Chinese visitors ("Korea's 
Dependence on China Deepens With Ex-
ports", Korea Times, 3rd November 2015). 
No matter what kind of responses the many 
questions receive, the reforms generally 
targeting the establishment of a "creative" 
economy are also helpful in organising and 
raising Korean-Chinese trade to a new level. 
 
About the author: Dr. Detlef Rehn lives 
and works in Japan as a freelance econo-
mics journalist. After studying in both Bonn 
and Beijing and subsequently holding the 
position of research associate at the Bonn 
East Asia Institute, from 1990 until his reti-
rement in May 2014 the graduate econo-
mist worked as a correspondent in Taipei, 
Seoul and Tokyo for the German Office for 
Foreign Trade (Bundesagentur für Außen-
wirtschaft, BFAI), which subsequently be-
came Germany Trade and Invest (GTaI). 
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